Hegemony and the Tragedy of Great Power Politics

"There are no status quo powers in the international system, save for the occasional hegemon that wants to maintain its dominating position over potential rivals. Great powers are rarely content with the current distribution of power; on the contrary, they face a constant incentive to change it in their favor. They almost always have revisionist intentions, and they will use force to alter the balance of power if they think it can be done at a reasonable price. At times, the costs and risks of trying to shift the balance of power are too great, forcing great powers to wait for more favorable circumstances. But the desire for more power does not go away, unless a state achieves the ultimate goal of hegemony. Since no state is likely to achieve global hegemony, however, the world is condemned to perpetual great-power competition."
--John J. Mearsheimer

John Mearsheimer's The Tragedy of Great Power Politics presents his theory of offensive realism, a stark view of international relations. In an anarchic global system—lacking any central authority to enforce order or guarantee security—great powers face constant uncertainty and potential threats from one another.

The book was published in January of 2001, only months before the Twin Towers fell on 9/11, an event that led to a whole series of disturbing events and much suffering.

Mearsheimer builds his argument on five core assumptions: the international system is anarchic; great powers possess offensive military capabilities; states cannot be certain of others' intentions; survival is the primary goal; and states act rationally to achieve it. From these, he concludes that great powers behave aggressively, not out of inherent malice, but because the best way to ensure survival is to maximize relative power and prevent rivals from gaining dominance.

My takeaway, from what I've read thus far, and that the great powers operate from a stance of fear. This seems counterintuitive on one level. You would think the lesser powers were driven by insecurity and thus strive to form alliances with the greater powers much like the remoras that hover around sharks and benefit from the scraps.

What Mearsheimer suggests is that everyone, from weakest to strongest, is fear driven. It makes me think of the manner in which individuals similarly are often driven by an underlying fear in order to protect themselves from being hurt. 

In other words, our natural inclination is self-interest instead of love, compassion, empathy. This is why loving others, truly caring and serving, is a miracle.

Returning to the book, Mearsheimer lays out the case for offensive realism, proposing that there can never be true security without absolute dominance, ideally global, but at minimum regional—to eliminate threats. This relentless pursuit creates a "tragedy": even security-seeking states provoke insecurity, competition, and often war, as cooperation remains limited and trust elusive.

Mearsheimer supports his claims with historical evidence from the 19th and 20th centuries, analyzing great-power behavior across Europe, Asia, and beyond, showing the driving forces behind Napoleon, Bismarck, WWI and WW2. He argues that post-Cold War optimism about enduring peace was misplaced; great-power rivalry persists as an enduring feature of world politics.

The events of these past 25 years only seem to confirm what he proposed in 2001, in Afghanistan, Iraq, Yemen, Ukraine, Syria, Libya, and now Venezuela, Gaza, Iran and the Middle East.  

Related Link

Humanity Hanging from a Cross of Iron: Eisenhower's Forgotten Warning on the True Cost of War