When Assassination Becomes Strategy: What Rise and Kill First Reveals

While doing research on another project I came across a reference to Ronen Bergman's Rise and Kill First: The Secret History of Israel’s Targeted Assassinations. (The English translation was published in 2018.) The book is purportedly a deeply researched and disturbing nonfiction history of Israel’s targeted assassinations programs carried out by its intelligence and security services (including Mossad, Shin Bet, and the IDF). Bergman draws on hundreds of interviews and thousands of previously classified documents to trace the evolution of targeted killing as a state policy from before Israel’s founding through the modern era.

The title comes from a Talmudic idea: “If someone comes to kill you, rise up and kill him first.” The book explores the ethical, political, and operational dimensions of targeted killings — from early Zionist underground groups to modern high-technology efforts against adversaries across the Middle East.

EdNote: This view stands in stark contrast to the Christian beliefs expressed by Tolstoy (most notably in The Forged Coupon) and the pacifism of George Fox and the Quakers.

The book was a New York Times bestseller and won awards for history writing, noted for its depth and narrative power.

Rise and Kill First argues that assassination became embedded in Israeli strategy because of the country’s sense of permanent existential threat. Bergman shows how targeted killings were used to disrupt militant networks, deter enemies, and compensate for Israel’s small size and lack of strategic depth. At the same time, he explores the moral, legal, and psychological costs of this approach, including blowback, cycles of retaliation, operational failures, and the toll on those ordered to carry out killings.

Rather than offering a simple defense or condemnation, Bergman presents assassination as a grim, recurring choice—sometimes tactically effective, sometimes disastrous, always ethically fraught. The result is a complex portrait of a state that has repeatedly chosen preemptive violence while struggling with the consequences of making killing routine policy.

One of the claims in Bergman's book is that “during the presidency of George W. Bush, the United States of America carried out 48 targeted killing operations, according to one estimate, and under President Barack Obama there were 353 such attacks.” These numbers were presented as an estimate, but when I sought a confirmation of these alleged facts I found that these numbers refer specifically to targeted killing operations (primarily drone strikes or other precision strikes against individuals), focused on covert/counterterrorism actions outside declared war zones like Afghanistan/Iraq battlefields (e.g., in Pakistan, Yemen, Somalia). They are not totals for all U.S. airstrikes or combat deaths.

Sources have slight variations in exact numbers, but confirm the numbers in proximity to what Bergman has stated.

The Bureau of Investigative Journalism (a key open-source monitor) reported ~57 strikes under Bush (mostly in Pakistan, Yemen, Somalia) vs. ~563 under Obama in those same areas—showing a roughly 10x increase, consistent with the book's emphasis on escalation. A New York Times review of the book cited at least 47 under Bush and 542 under Obama for Pakistan/Yemen/Somalia campaigns, very near Bergman's 48/353 figures (possibly excluding some categories or using different cutoffs). Other sources (e.g., Council on Foreign Relations) report 542 Obama-era strikes, with estimates of thousands killed (including civilians).

As Bob Dylan states in his song "Union Sundown" (Infidels, 1983), "This world is ruled by violence; but I guess that's better left unsaid." Is it a cynical view or a realistic one, that true power lies in force, not ideals like democracy. Dylan frequently highlights  harsh truths behind political facades, contrasting democratic ideals with the brutal mechanics of control, especially in the context of labor and global economics. 

If you find all these things disturbing, you're not alone.

Related
Hegemony and the Tragedy of Great Power Politics

Orwell as Warning, Witness, and Writer

For Christmas this year I was given a number of books including The Diaries of George Orwell, edited by Peter Davison with an introduction by Christopher Hitchens. (So many books, so little time!)

The book is not a complete compilation of Orwell's diaries. Rather, it extracts portions thematically from the various periods of his life beginning with 1931, 1936 (Road to Wigan Pier), domestic life, 1939 Morocco diaries, events leading up to the war, war diaries and relevant excerpts from Orwell's notebooks. 

Essentially this compilation offers an intimate, unguarded view of Orwell’s daily life and moral temperament. Spanning illness, wartime London, farming, and political anxiety, the entries reveal a mind attentive to ordinary detail and ethical consequence. Davison’s editing strives to preserve Orwell’s voice while situating it historically, deepening our understanding of how lived experience shaped his essays, novels, and enduring political conscience.

I've often said, "If a man is worth knowing at all, he's worth knowing well." In my opinion Eric Blair, whom the world knows as George Orwell, was such a man. For this reason I'm looking forward to taking deeper look at the interior life of this keen observer of the world he lived in.

In the meantime, here are links to nine essays (blog posts) that I've written about this influential author.

George Orwell's "How the Poor Die": Exploring Themes of Inequality, Neglect and Other Grim Realities

https://pioneerproductions.blogspot.com/2024/09/george-orwells-how-poor-die-exploring.html

George Orwell on Wells, Hitler and "Patriotism vs. the World State"

https://pioneerproductions.blogspot.com/2021/07/george-orwell-on-wells-hitler-and.html

Orwell on Media Mischief

https://pioneerproductions.blogspot.com/2021/11/orwell-on-media-mischief.html

Orwell's Homage to Catalonia Is Instructive on Many Levels, Plus a Good Read

https://pioneerproductions.blogspot.com/2021/08/orwells-homage-to-catalonia-is.html

George Orwell on Wells, Hitler and "Patriotism vs. the World State"

https://pioneerproductions.blogspot.com/2021/07/george-orwell-on-wells-hitler-and.html

Did you Know George Orwell Took a Stand Against Paperbacks?

https://pioneerproductions.blogspot.com/2019/11/flashback-friday-did-you-know-george.html

Public Introspection: George Orwell's Why I Write

https://pioneerproductions.blogspot.com/2016/08/public-introspection-george-orwells-why.html

Shooting an Elephant

https://pioneerproductions.blogspot.com/2011/05/shooting-elephant.html

Excerpts from Orwell's The Road to Wigan Pier

https://pioneerproductions.blogspot.com/2023/09/excerpts-from-orwells-road-to-wigan-pier.html

Other noteworthy journals and diaries I have read include Thomas Mann and Andre Gide

You Can't Always Know Who the Good Guys Are

After a tour of duty in Afghanistan, former rock star wannabe Vin Sarno returns to his Savannah homestead to figure out where he wants to spend the next chapter of his life. Shortly after returning home he decides to kill time by helping with his father’s “Ghost Tour” business. Doing midnight walking tours through Old Savannah brings back memories of Kabul, including a bad experience with some real spooks he encountered during a short prison stint in that shattered land.

You Can't Always Know Who the Good Guys Are is journalist Gerald Flanagan’s first novel and once it gets going it’s a riveting nail-biter. The pace at first feels like the angst of an existential stain squeezed from an over-sized abscess. But once Flanagan paints the setting, the story is a runaway train and though you’ve been down this track before the only thing you know for sure is that your hero will never be the same.

In the midst of everything is an unrequited love with ambiguous possibilities. Aliyah is the daughter of a Taliban chieftain who finds it impossible to believe Sarno can bring her the deliverance she so longs for from this insane life she’s endured. There are few places on earth where it is more difficult to be a woman.

Flanagan, who served as an embedded journalist in the Iraq war also lived in Karachi, Pakistan and Kabul where he reported on the hunt for Osama bin Laden for two British magazines and the Washington Post. With ease he paints the scenery which serves as backdrop for the story.

The Savannah portions of the book have just enough levity to release some of the tension readers will experience. The graveyard and ghost stories that have become entertainments today contain kernels of horror that find echoes amongst the Taliban. The manner in which the author takes the impossible and convinces readers that it is probable is quite astonishing.

Perhaps at the root of the story is Sarno's pain at knowing that his future with Aliyah can never work out, and that the entire mission of his life has been an epic struggle in futility. Nevertheless he knows no other path.

What I like most about the book is when Flanagan causes the story to intersect with real events, including when Pat Tillman was killed by "friendly fire" and the first attempt on Osama bin Laden near the caves below the Khyber Pass. The net result is to create the impression that this fictional adventure/drama may actually be a true account of events that journalists are restricted from writing about.

Ultimately, if you can't find the book at Amazon.com or Barnes and Noble, the reason might be that this review is itself a fictional review of a fictional book. If you like fiction, especially the kind where you have trouble discerning the line between real and improbable, you may enjoy my own books of short stories, especially Unremembered Histories and Newmanesque.

This review was originally published in January 2012

Unless otherwise noted, all paintings and illustrative material at this site has been created by Ennyman.

Hegemony and the Tragedy of Great Power Politics

"There are no status quo powers in the international system, save for the occasional hegemon that wants to maintain its dominating position over potential rivals. Great powers are rarely content with the current distribution of power; on the contrary, they face a constant incentive to change it in their favor. They almost always have revisionist intentions, and they will use force to alter the balance of power if they think it can be done at a reasonable price. At times, the costs and risks of trying to shift the balance of power are too great, forcing great powers to wait for more favorable circumstances. But the desire for more power does not go away, unless a state achieves the ultimate goal of hegemony. Since no state is likely to achieve global hegemony, however, the world is condemned to perpetual great-power competition."
--John J. Mearsheimer

John Mearsheimer's The Tragedy of Great Power Politics presents his theory of offensive realism, a stark view of international relations. In an anarchic global system—lacking any central authority to enforce order or guarantee security—great powers face constant uncertainty and potential threats from one another.

The book was published in January of 2001, only months before the Twin Towers fell on 9/11, an event that led to a whole series of disturbing events and much suffering.

Mearsheimer builds his argument on five core assumptions: the international system is anarchic; great powers possess offensive military capabilities; states cannot be certain of others' intentions; survival is the primary goal; and states act rationally to achieve it. From these, he concludes that great powers behave aggressively, not out of inherent malice, but because the best way to ensure survival is to maximize relative power and prevent rivals from gaining dominance.

My takeaway, from what I've read thus far, and that the great powers operate from a stance of fear. This seems counterintuitive on one level. You would think the lesser powers were driven by insecurity and thus strive to form alliances with the greater powers much like the remoras that hover around sharks and benefit from the scraps.

What Mearsheimer suggests is that everyone, from weakest to strongest, is fear driven. It makes me think of the manner in which individuals similarly are often driven by an underlying fear in order to protect themselves from being hurt. 

In other words, our natural inclination is self-interest instead of love, compassion, empathy. This is why loving others, truly caring and serving, is a miracle.

Returning to the book, Mearsheimer lays out the case for offensive realism, proposing that there can never be true security without absolute dominance, ideally global, but at minimum regional—to eliminate threats. This relentless pursuit creates a "tragedy": even security-seeking states provoke insecurity, competition, and often war, as cooperation remains limited and trust elusive.

Mearsheimer supports his claims with historical evidence from the 19th and 20th centuries, analyzing great-power behavior across Europe, Asia, and beyond, showing the driving forces behind Napoleon, Bismarck, WWI and WW2. He argues that post-Cold War optimism about enduring peace was misplaced; great-power rivalry persists as an enduring feature of world politics.

The events of these past 25 years only seem to confirm what he proposed in 2001, in Afghanistan, Iraq, Yemen, Ukraine, Syria, Libya, and now Venezuela, Gaza, Iran and the Middle East.  

Related Link

Humanity Hanging from a Cross of Iron: Eisenhower's Forgotten Warning on the True Cost of War

25 Countries Have Bullet Trains. Why Don't We?

Photo: MaedaAkihiko Creative Commons 4.0

Alright. We've put men on the moon and land rovers on Mars. It's obvious we have the technical know-how. So what's the problem? 

First, most countries have national rail ownership, centralized planning and eminent domain authority, which our citizens especially despise. The U.S., on the other hand, has Federal, state and local layers, and lawyers bringing decades of litigation. Key transport corridors are served by privately owned railroads.  

A. second reason is that in the U.S., highways and airports are our primary investment, both of which are subsidized. Passenger rail's decline leads to ever fewer passengers, so the trains are unprofitable except between key locations. Europe and Japan treat rail as core infrastructure, not an alternative.

Land acquisition and lawsuits make it hard for railroads to calculate costs. Project delays increase the costs exponentially with long environmental reviews, property challenges and political opposition the whole way. As a result, U.S. infrastructure projects are slower, more legally complex and far more expensive per mile than peers.

It's ironic that the U.S. invented much of the rail technology that is used around the world today. What's lacking may simply be political will. When you look at the numbers--most Amtrak routes are losing money--it's probably easier for leaders to say, "This is not my fight. I've got too many other irons in the fire." 

Without a visionary, projects perish.

Related Link: That Used To Be Us

Colin Powell's UN Speech: A Pivotal Moment in the Lead-Up to the Iraq War

In the tense atmosphere following the September 11 terrorist attacks of 2001, the United States under President George W. Bush sought to confront perceived threats from rogue states. Iraq, led by Saddam Hussein, became a focal point due to longstanding suspicions of its weapons programs. On February 5, 2003, Secretary of State Colin Powell delivered a landmark address to the United Nations Security Council, aiming to justify a potential U.S.-led invasion. This speech, lasting over an hour, represented the Bush administration's most concerted effort to garner international support for military action against Iraq.

Powell's presentation was meticulously crafted to build a case around Iraq's alleged possession of weapons of mass destruction (WMDs). He repeatedly invoked the phrase "weapons of mass destruction" 17 times, emphasizing the grave danger posed by Saddam's regime. Drawing on declassified intelligence, Powell displayed satellite imagery purportedly showing Iraqi mobile biological weapons labs, chemical munitions bunkers, and efforts to conceal prohibited activities from UN inspectors. He held up a small vial of white powder to simulate anthrax, warning that a similar amount could cause mass casualties in a city like Washington, D.C. Powell also alleged ties between Iraq and al-Qaeda, claiming that Saddam harbored terrorists and provided them with training in poisons and explosives. He argued that Iraq had violated UN Resolution 1441, which demanded full disarmament, and that diplomacy had failed. "Leaving Saddam Hussein in possession of weapons of mass destruction for a few more months or years is not an option, not in a post-September 11th world," Powell declared, framing the issue as an existential threat to global security.

The circumstances surrounding the speech were marked by intense internal pressures within the Bush administration. Powell, a respected former general and the first African American Secretary of State, was known for his cautious "Powell Doctrine," which emphasized overwhelming force and clear exit strategies only when vital interests were at stake. However, in the post-9/11 fervor, hawks like Vice President Dick Cheney and Defense Secretary Donald Rumsfeld pushed aggressively for regime change in Iraq, viewing it as unfinished business from the 1991 Gulf War. Ah, regime change, the American pastime. American as apple pie.

Intelligence reports, often cherry-picked or exaggerated by the administration's Office of Special Plans, painted a dire picture of Iraqi WMDs. Powell initially resisted, expressing skepticism about the evidence's reliability. He spent four days at CIA headquarters reviewing materials with Director George Tenet, who assured him of their solidity—famously calling the case a "slam dunk." 

Yet, behind the scenes, Powell faced immense pressure to align with the White House's agenda. As the administration's most credible figure—polls showed Americans trusted him on Iraq policy far more than Bush (63% vs. 24%)—he was essentially drafted to "sell" the war to a skeptical international community. 

In one of his books Powell shared the manner in which the President coerced him into making this speech: "Colin, you're the only one around here with any skin left on your nose." i.e., nobody trusted anyone else in the Bush administration at this point. Perhaps with good reason.  

Reports later revealed that the decision to invade had already been made by early 2003, rendering Powell's speech more of a justification than a deliberation. Dissenting voices within the State Department were sidelined, and Powell's own reservations were overridden by loyalty to the president and the weight of national security imperatives.

Despite its initial impact—bolstering U.S. public support for the war—the speech's claims unraveled as no WMDs were found after the March 2003 invasion. Powell's address, once hailed as persuasive, became a symbol of intelligence manipulation. In retrospect, Powell expressed profound regret over his role. 

In a 2005 interview, he called the speech a "blot" on his record, admitting it was based on flawed intelligence that represented a "great intelligence failure." He lamented being misled by the CIA and the administration's rush to war, stating in later reflections that it damaged his credibility and haunted him until his death in 2021. Powell's remorse underscored the perils of politicized intelligence and the human cost of decisions made under duress.

This story came to mind as I thought about one of my own weaknesses, unnecessarily caving in to pressure from others. Like a "fly in the ointment" this minor flaw of trying to please others has spoiled a number of otherwise pleasant, successful, or positive situations, tainting what ought to have been wonderfully sweet moments and memories.

There's a similar notion conveyed in this passage from the Song of Solomon: "Little foxes spoil the vines," implying that small, seemingly insignificant things--like bad habits--can cause significant damage if left unchecked, much like tiny foxes destroying a vineyard's tender, blossoming grapes.

Related Link

The Bus to Abilene 

It Worked for Me: In Life and Leadership

Orwell’s Warning: Does the Media Reveal Truth or Manufacture Illusion?

Though George Orwell is most famous for his last two books, Animal Farm and 1984, his essays cannot be neglected. Orwell’s essays are significant for their moral clarity, plainspoken prose, and fearless engagement with power, language, and truth. Orwell exposed how political language distorts reality and how intellectual dishonesty enables oppression. His essays have endured because they model a rare union of ethical seriousness, stylistic precision, and civic responsibility.

While reading Keith Gessen's introduction to All Art Is Propaganda, this passage especially struck home.

Orwell's voice as a writer had been formed before Spain, but Spain gave him a jolt--not the fighting or the injury [EdNote: He was shot in the neck by a sniper while fighting in the Spanish Civil War], though these had their effects, but the calculated campaign of deception he saw in the press when he got back, waged by people who knew better.

"Early in life I had noticed that no event is ever correctly reported in a newspaper," Orwell recalled, "but in Spain, for the first time, I saw newspaper reports which did not bear any relation to the facts, not even the relationship which is implied in an ordinary lie. I saw great battles reported where there had been no fighting, and complete silence where hundreds of men had been killed... kind of thing is frightening to me, because it often gives me the feeling that the very concept of objective truth is fading out of the world. After all, the chances are that those lies, or at any rate similar lies, will pass into history."  

This insight reverberates through Orwell's work for the rest of his life.  

For anyone paying attention, it should be a recurring theme throughout our own lifetimes. What is true? What's really going on?

It takes work, discernment and wisdom to see through the fog, and in some cases we'll never really know what the story really is. What we can do, however, be willing to set things on the shelf until we know more or it becomes irrelevant to know. It takes courage to say, "I don't know" when everyone else is clamoring for you to take a position.

My father was once called to jury duty for a trial the required a verdict with regards to a serious crime. Both sides painted a compelling argument for guilt or innocence. It became clear that one side was lying, but their arguments were so carefully laid out that he had no idea which side was lying and which was telling the truth.

To me, it seems clear that a measured skepticism is the only way to engage today's news media. This means questioning sources, incentives, framing, and omissions while still valuing verified reporting and evidence. Uncritical acceptance invites manipulation; total cynicism invites ignorance. And sometimes we just don't know.